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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to develop a general framework for the
macroeconomic modelling of monetary unions, which could be useful for policy
analysis, as well as for teaching purposes. Our starting point will be the standard two-
country Mundell-Fleming model with perfect capital mobility, extended to incorporate
the supply side, and modified so that the money market is common for two countries
forming a monetary union. The model is presented in two versions: for a small and a big
monetary union, respectively. After solving each model, we will derive multipliers for
monetary, real (i. e., demand-side), supply, and external shocks, paying a special
attention to the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric shocks. A graphical
analysis is also provided.
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11. Introduction
The concept of “monetary union” has acquired a renewed interest in last years, as
illustrated by the recent formation of the so-called Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) by 12 member countries of the European Union. The possibility of advancing
towards a monetary union is also being discussed in other integrated economic areas,
such as MERCOSUR or NAFTA.
From another point of view, establishing a monetary union has even been
suggested as an alternative to a system of fixed exchange rates. As is well known, recent
experiences (such as the crisis of the European Monetary System in 1992-1993, or the
cases of Mexico and the South-Eastern Asian countries at the end of 1994 and 1997,
respectively) have shown the increasing difficulty for a country to build the reputation
needed to sustain a fixed exchange rate system. The ultimate reason is the spectacular
growth of world capital markets, following the continuous liberalization and
deregulation of capital movements that occurred in last years. So, if a government’s
compromise of maintaining a certain exchange rate is not believed as credible by
financial markets, huge speculative attacks will take place, so that central banks will
find extremely difficult to respond to a speculative attack at such a massive scale. All
this has led to some authors (e. g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) to suggest that, in the
near future, the choice faced by a country would be either maintaining a flexible
exchange rate or adopting a common currency, rather than a fixed exchange rate, with
other related countries.
However, macroeconomic models of monetary unions are not very frequent in
the literature. Indeed, monetary unions are not properly described by either a fixed or a
flexible exchange rate system, so that a specific framework would be required. The
reason is that, on the one hand, the formation of a monetary union means the adoption
of the same currency for all the countries concerned (which amounts to establishing a
fixed exchange rate between the common currency and the old national currencies); but,
on the other hand, the exchange rate between the common currency and the rest of
currencies in the world will be (usually) flexible. This is particularly important in the
face of country-specific or asymmetric shocks (i. e., those affecting to some of the
monetary union’s members, but not to others). However, as we will see, in the face of
common or symmetric shocks (i. e., those equally affecting to all the monetary union’s
members), their macroeconomic effects will coincide with those derived from a
conventional model in which the monetary union is taken as one country.
As mentioned above, attempts to provide macroeconomic models for monetary
unions are not common in the literature. A pioneering contribution is Levin (1983), who
develops a model for the analysis of stabilisation policy in a currency area, but only the
demand-side of the model is considered. Also, Marston (1984) discusses the choice
between a flexible exchange rate and an exchange rate union, following several
alternative shocks, in a model where (unlike Levin’s) the supply side is incorporated. A
related analysis is that of Läufer and Sundararajan (1994), who develop a three-country
model, with a fixed exchange rate among two of them, and a flexible exchange rate
towards the third country, and study the international transmission of several economic
disturbances (demand-side, monetary, and third-country shocks). A common feature to
all these papers is that they consider the case of a small monetary union (or two small
2fixed exchange-rate countries, in the case of Läufer and Sundararajan), i. e., the case in
which the rest of the world’s variables are taken as exogenous.
A very interesting contribution to the modelling of monetary unions is De Bonis
(1994), who discusses the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies in two
alternative models designed, respectively, for a small and a big monetary union (i. e.,
when the rest of the world’s variables are made endogenous). However, the supply-side
of the model is not fully specified (in particular, price interactions between the union’s
member countries are omitted for simplicity). In addition, since the analysis of monetary
and fiscal policies is mainly focused on their effects on the whole union’s economy, the
crucial distinction between symmetric and asymmetric shocks is neglected.
To summarise, and despite the growing (and potentially increasing) importance
of monetary unions in the real world, the literature specifically addressed to the
macroeconomic modelling of monetary unions is rather scarce and incomplete. The
objective of this paper is to develop a general framework for the macroeconomic
modelling of monetary unions, trying to make compatible both realism and tractability,
which could be useful for policy analysis, as well as for teaching purposes.
Our starting point will be the standard two-country Mundell-Fleming model with
perfect capital mobility, extended to incorporate the supply side in a context of rigid real
wages [see Mundell (1964) and Sachs (1980)]. This basic model will be modified so
that the money market becomes common for the two economies analysed, which form a
monetary union, and presented in two versions: for a small and a big monetary union.
After solving each model, we will derive multipliers for monetary, real (i. e., demand-
side), supply, and external shocks, paying a special attention to the distinction between
symmetric and asymmetric shocks.
The paper is organised as follows. The basic reference model is developed in
section 2, and the analysis for a small and a big monetary union is presented in sections
3 and 4, respectively. The main conclusions of the paper are summarised in section 5.
32. The model
2. 1. Description of the model
The model in this section will be linear in logs, with Greek letters (all of them taken to
be positive numbers) denoting multipliers, and asterisks denoting rest of the world’s
variables; time subscripts are omitted for simplicity. Perfect capital mobility is assumed,
and the exchange rate is flexible. Regarding expectations, we will make the simplifying
assumption that, for any variable x:
1-
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that is, the expected value of a variable equals that variable in the previous period. Since
we are in a static context, this assumption will allow us to identify real and nominal
interest rates, and domestic and foreign interest rates (due to the assumption of perfect
capital mobility; see below).
The demand side of the model is straightforward and given by:
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Equation (1) is the equilibrium condition in the goods market, where real output y
depends negatively on the interest rate i, and positively on the real exchange rate e + p* − p
(being e, p* and p, respectively, the nominal exchange rate - defined as the domestic
currency price of a unit of foreign currency-, and the foreign and domestic price levels),
the rest of the world’s output y*, and a real, positive, aggregate demand shock f (which can
include, for instance, the effect of a higher public sector deficit). Equation (2) is the
equilibrium condition in the money market, where real money balances (being m the
nominal money supply) equal the demand for money, which depend positively on output
and negatively on the interest rate. Finally, equation (3) is the condition for perfect capital
mobility, so that domestic and foreign interest rates would be equal to the world interest
rate, iW, common to all countries.
Regarding aggregate supply, we follow a “New Keynesian” approach [as in, e. g.,
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) or Carlin and Soskice (1990)]. The supply side of
the model includes a wage equation, a price equation, and a relationship between output
and employment:
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Equation (4) shows that the nominal wage w is fully indexed to the expected
value of the consumer price index ECp , and also depends negatively on the
unemployment rate u, and positively on productivity prod and wage pressure factors
summarised in zw. According to equation  (5), prices are set by adding a margin, which
depends on several variables summarised in zp, on average costs1. And equation (6)
defines employment n, as the difference between real output and productivity.
                                                          
1
 As usual, the coefficients on the variable prod are the same in the wage and price equations in order
to avoid that productivity would affect unemployment in the long run; see Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991).
4On the other hand, as explained above, expectations on the consumer price index
will equal the level of the consumption price index pC in the previous period:
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where the subscript –1 denotes the value of a variable the period before. The supply side of
the model should be completed with the definitions of the consumer price index, as a
weighted average of domestic and foreign prices, the latter valued in domestic currency:
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and the rate of unemployment, as the difference between active population l and
employment:
nlu −= (9)
Now, from (4) to (9), we can get the expression of the aggregate supply equation:
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where s is a contractionary supply shock summarising all the possible supply shocks
considered above:
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Finally, the long-run aggregate supply equation would be given by:
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In this way, our basic model is made up of equations (1) to (3), and (10) or (10’),
for the short and the long run, respectively. The advantage of this specification is that it
will allow us to study separately the immediate or impact effect of a shock, and its final
effect, once prices have adjusted to the new equilibrium.
2. 2. A macroeconomic model for a monetary union
Now we will assume that the above model describes a monetary union, i. e., a group of
countries that have decided abolishing their national currencies and adopting a new
currency, common to all of them; the exchange rate against the rest of the world is
assumed to be flexible. In order to make things as simple as possible, we will assume
that the monetary union is made up of two symmetric countries, denoted by the
subscripts 1 and 2; and that each variable of the union is a weighted average of the
corresponding variables of countries 1 and 2, with the weights equal to ½. In other
words, for any variable x:
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Therefore, if we write the union’s equations in terms of countries 1 and 2, the
model for the monetary union will be given by2:
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 As can be proved easily, from the weighted sum of equations (11) and (12), (14) and (15), and
(14’) and (15’), we can get, respectively, equations (1) (once replaced (3)), (10), and (10’); in
turn, equation  (13) would be a transformation of equation (2) (once replaced (3)).
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while, in the long run, equations (14) and (15) should be replaced by:
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If we take the rest of the world’s variables (y*, p*, and iW) as exogenous, the model
given by equations (11) to (15) would represent the case of a small monetary union, i. e.,
when (in analogy to the small open economy case) the union is so small that is unable to
affect the economic conditions of the rest of the world. In this case, the model of the
monetary union has five endogenous variables: y1, y2, p1, p2, and e.
However, we could alternatively assume that the union is big enough to influence
the economic conditions of the rest of the world. This would be the case of a big monetary
union, where the rest of the world’s variables become endogenous, so that the economy of
the rest of the world should be explicitly modelled. Assuming an analogous framework to
that of the union, and writing the union’s variables in terms of countries 1 and 2, the rest
of the world’s equations would be:
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with equation (18) replaced in the long run by:
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In this way, the model of the big monetary union would be given by equations (11)
to (18), and the eight endogenous variables would be: y1, y2, p1, p2, y*, p*, e, and iW.
2. 3. Characterisation of the shocks
In this paper we are going to examine the effects of different shocks on the endogenous
variables of the model presented above. To that end, we need to characterise the kind of
shocks to be analysed in the rest of the paper.
6From the perspective of the monetary union, shocks will be characterised following
two criteria:
(i) In which sector of the economy the shock occurs, so that we can distinguish
among monetary, real (i. e., aggregate demand), supply, and external
shocks, when the shock occurs in the money market, the goods market, the
supply side, and the foreign sector of the economy, respectively.
(ii) Whether the shock affects equally to all the countries belonging to the
monetary union, i. e., the case of a common or symmetric shock; or,
alternatively, whether the shock first occurs in a particular country, and
so affects differently to every member country of the union, i. e., the case
of a country-specific or asymmetric shock.
According to this classification, monetary and external shocks would be always
symmetric; unlike real and supply shocks, which can be either asymmetric or symmetric3.
Due to our assumption of perfectly symmetric countries, the effect of a
symmetric shock would be the same both on every member country of the union, and on
the union as a whole. As we will see in the next two sections, the effect of a symmetric
shock in our models would be equivalent to the results derived from conventional
models in which the monetary union is taken as one country [i. e., the Sachs (1980)
model for the small monetary union case, and its two-country counterpart for the big
monetary union case].
In turn, the effect of an asymmetric shock would be the same on any member
country of the union where the shock first occurs, and also the same on any member
country of the union where the shock is later transmitted; however, the effect would be
different for the country of origin of the shock, when compared to the country where the
shock is transmitted. The reason would be that an asymmetric shock first occurring in one
of the countries of the union can be transmitted to the other either with the same sign
(which is sometimes called the “locomotive effect”), or with the opposite sign (so that the
shock would be “beggar-thy-neighbour”), depending on the channel of transmission (the
aggregate demand, or the interest rate and the real exchange rate, respectively).
On the other hand, the effect of an asymmetric shock on the union as a whole
would have the same sign than in the country where the shock first occurs, and would be
equal to one half of the sum of the effects on every member country4. Notice that the effect
on the union would be greater, in absolute value, than one half the effect on the country of
origin of the shock, for the “locomotive effect” case; and lower, in absolute value, if the
shock is “beggar-thy-neighbour”.
                                                          
3
 Strictly speaking, there can be asymmetric monetary shocks, affecting to the demand for money
in only one of the member countries of the union (remember that money supply is commonly
determined in a monetary union). However, it can be shown that the effect of this kind of shock
would be the same on both countries and on the union as a whole, and equal to one half of the
effect of a (symmetric) money supply shock. The ultimate reason would be that the money
market is common to all the member countries of the union. In other words, an asymmetric
money demand shock would work in practice as a symmetric shock.
4
 Recall that this result derives from our assumption of perfectly symmetric countries. If the shock
was “beggar-thy-neighbour”, the higher the weight of the country to which the shock is
transmitted, the lower would be the effect of the shock on the union as a whole; and, if the
weight of that country was very high, the shock might be “beggar-thy-neighbour” even for the
whole union.
7Next, we will introduce some terminology. From now on, any shock d will be
denoted
0≠d
when symmetric;
0,0 21 =≠ dd
when asymmetric, originated in country 1; and
0,0 21 ≠= dd
when asymmetric, originated in country 2.
On the other hand, we will always consider the case of positively signed shocks
(the case of “negative” shocks would be analogous), which will be denoted as follows:
• Monetary shocks, as m > 0 (reflecting an increase in money supply or,
alternatively, a decrease in money demand, occurring within the monetary
union).
• Real shocks, as f1 > 0 or f2 > 0 if asymmetric, or f1 = f2 = f > 0 if symmetric
(reflecting a higher public sector deficit or, alternatively, any other exogenous
increase in aggregate demand, occurring within the monetary union).
• Supply shocks, as s1 > 0 or s2 > 0 if asymmetric, or s1 = s2 = s > 0 if symmetric
(reflecting an exogenous increase in prices or wages, a fall in active population
or productivity, and, in general, any contractionary shock affecting the supply
side of the monetary union).
• External shocks, as ∆y* > 0, ∆p* > 0, or ∆iW > 0, for the small monetary union
case (reflecting a positive shock to the trade balance through higher foreign
output or prices, and a negative shock to capital movements through a higher
world interest rate, respectively); or as m* > 0, f* > 0, or s* > 0, for the big
monetary union case (reflecting a positive foreign monetary shock, a positive
foreign real shock, and a negative foreign supply shock, respectively,
analogous to those previously defined for the monetary union).
In the next two sections we will analyse the effects of the different shocks
considered above on the endogenous variables of the two models developed in this section,
that is, those describing a small and a big monetary union, respectively. As in Sargent
(1979), we will get reduced forms for the endogenous variables as a function of the shocks,
and then derive multipliers, i. e., partial derivatives of the endogenous variables with
respect to the shocks. Notice that, since our models are linear in logs, these multipliers will
represent elasticities. For simplicity, we will only show the signs of the multipliers; their
full expressions can be seen in the Appendix. A graphical analysis of the models will be
also provided.
83. The model for a small monetary union
3. 1. Multipliers of the shocks
As shown in section 2, the model for a small monetary union would be given by equations
(11) to (15), with five endogenous variables: y1, y2, p1, p2, and e. Recall that in this case the
rest of the world’s variables (y*, p*, and iW) would be exogenous to the model. We will
present first the short-run multipliers, obtained after solving the model given by equations
(11) to (15), and then the long-run multipliers, obtained from the solution of the long-run
version of the model, i. e., that given by equations (11) to (13), (14’) and (15’).
The multipliers would be, for the different shocks analysed:
A) Monetary shocks
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B) Real shocks
B. 1) Asymmetric real shocks
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B. 2) Symmetric real shocks
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C) Supply shocks
C. 1) Asymmetric supply shocks
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C. 2) Symmetric supply shocks
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D) External shocks
D. 1) Foreign output shocks
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D. 2) Foreign price shocks
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D. 3) World interest rate shocks
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3. 2. Graphical analysis
Next, we will provide a graphical analysis of the effects derived from the different shocks
considered. Our graphical apparatus will consist of:
(i) The YY and LL curves5, linking the output levels of countries 1 and 2;
(ii) The aggregate demand functions of countries 1 and 2 AD1 and AD2, to be
derived below; and
(iii) The short-run aggregate supply functions of countries 1 and 2 AS1 and AS2,
that is, equations (14) and (15).
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 These curves were first introduced by Levin (1983).
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If we subtract (12) from (11), i. e., the equilibrium condition in the goods market of
country 2 from the analogue for country 1, we get the YY curve:
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as a positively signed relationship between the output levels of countries 1 and 2. This
would be so, since an increase (decrease) in country 2’s output would lead to a worsening
(improvement) in its trade balance, which would require, to keep the equilibrium, a
depreciation (appreciation) of the exchange rate, leading in turn to an increase (decrease) in
country 1’s output. The slope of the curve would be equal to one given our assumption of
symmetry regarding both countries’ economic frameworks.
In turn, from (13), i. e., the equilibrium condition in the money market of the union,
we get the LL curve:
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as a negatively signed relationship between the output levels of countries 1 and 2. This
would be so, since an increase (decrease) in country 2’s output would lead to an increase
(decrease) in its demand for money, which would require, to keep the equilibrium, a
decrease (increase) in the demand for money of country 1, and hence an decrease
(increase) in that country’s output. The slope of the curve would be again equal to one,
now in absolute value.
If we replace y2 from LL in YY, we get the aggregate demand function for country
1, AD1:
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and, in a similar way, replacing y1 from LL in YY, we get the aggregate demand function
for country 2, AD2:
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Finally, we will modify the YY and LL curves above, by eliminating p1 and p2. In
this way, our modified YY curve follows after replacing p1 − p2 from (14) and (15):
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and, in a similar way, our modified LL curve follows after replacing p1 + p2 from (14) and
(15):
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Figure 1 shows the graphical apparatus used to discuss the effects of shocks in our
model. The modified YY and LL curves [equations (21) and (22)] are represented in panel
(a) of the figure, and the aggregate demand and aggregate supply functions AD1 and AS1
for country 1 [equations (19) and (14)], and AD2 and AS2 for country 2 [equations (20) and
(15)], appear in panels (b) and (c), respectively; panel (d) is used to connect panels (a) and
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(c). In the rest of this section we will examine the effects of different shocks to the
monetary union, in terms of the graphical apparatus shown in Figure 1. As a general rule,
point 1 in the figures denotes the initial equilibrium before the shock; and points 2 and 3
denote, respectively, the short-run or transitory equilibrium after the shock occurs, and the
long-run or final equilibrium following the completion of the full set of effects of the shock
(due to the lags in price adjustment assumed in the supply side).
We begin with the case of an (always symmetric) expansionary monetary shock, m
> 0, in Figure 2. Starting from point 1, this shock means an aggregate demand expansion in
the short run, both in countries 1 and 2 and the union as a whole, due not only to the shock
in itself, but also to the exchange rate depreciation; the LL, AD1 and AD2 curves shift to the
right, and countries 1 and 2 stay at point 2 in the figure. However, the increase in prices in
both countries, together with the exchange rate depreciation, lead to a later shift to the left
of LL (fully offsetting the initial shift to the right), as well as of AS1 and AS2 (due to the
higher wage aspirations in both countries). In the end, countries 1 and 2 move to point 3 in
Figure 2, and in the long run the monetary shock would be neutral on output, with a price
increase equal to the exchange rate depreciation (so that the real exchange rate would not
change). The result would be the same in countries 1 and 2, as well as in the union as a
whole.
The case of an asymmetric expansionary real shock in country 1, f1 > 0, is depicted
in Figure 36. Aggregate demand expands in country 1 but contracts in country 2, since the
shock has led to an exchange rate appreciation, which, despite the positive transmission of
the shock through higher output in country 1, would reduce output in country 2; in turn, the
exchange rate appreciation and the output contraction in country 2 would partially offset
the initial expansion in country 1. In terms of the figure, the YY and AD1 curves shift to the
right, and AD2 to the left, so that countries 1 and 2 move from point 1 to point 2. Notice,
however, that the effect on the union would be nil since, due to our assumption of
symmetry regarding countries 1 and 2, the demand expansion in country 1 would fully
offset the demand contraction in country 2; in other words, for the union as a whole the
exchange rate appreciation would fully counteract the expansionary demand shock that
occurred in country 1. Next, the exchange rate appreciation, through its effect on wage
setting, would lead to a rightward shift of LL, AS1 and AS2, and countries 1 and 2 would
move to point 3 in Figure 3.
The final result would be an output increase with an ambiguous effect on prices in
country 1, coupled with an ambiguous effect on output and a decrease in prices in country
2; we have assumed in the figure a final output contraction in country 2. The effect on
country 2’s output would depend on the relative weight of the real appreciation against the
rest of the world, on the one hand, and the output expansion in country 1 together with the
real depreciation against the latter, on the other hand. As for the union as a whole, output
would increase (so that the expansion in country 1 would be greater than the eventual
contraction in country 2, if the shock was beggar-thy-neighbour as in Figure 3) and prices
would decrease (i. e., the price fall in country 2 would predominate even if prices go up in
country 1).
We can derive the condition for an asymmetric real shock being beggar-thy-
neighbour in the other member country of the union, from the multipliers in the Appendix.
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 The case of an asymmetric expansionary real shock in country 2, f2 > 0, would be fully analogous,
with the results for countries 1 and 2 now happening in countries 2 and 1, respectively.
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This condition can be expressed as a threshold value for σ, a parameter which would proxy
the degree of openness of the member countries of the union  (i. e., the greater σ, the lower
the degree of openness), as:
βϕ+γ
βϕ+γ
>σ
32
22
If the expansionary real shock would be symmetric rather than asymmetric, f1 = f2 =
f > 0, we would have the situation given by Figure 4. Since the aggregate demand
expansion would be exactly balanced by the exchange rate appreciation, the short-run
equilibrium at point 2 in the figure will coincide with the initial equilibrium at point 1; the
rightward shift of the YY, AD1 and AD2 curves due to the expansionary real shock would be
fully offset by a leftward shift due to the exchange rate appreciation. As before, the
appreciation of the exchange rate would shift rightwards LL, AS1 and AS2, so countries 1
and 2 would finish at point 3, with a long-run output expansion coupled with a fall in
prices both for countries 1 and 2 and the union as a whole.
We turn now to the analysis of supply shocks, beginning with the case of an
asymmetric contractionary supply shock in country 1, s1 > 0, in Figure 57. As output
contracts and prices rise in country 1, the transmission of the shock to country 2 would be
ambiguous, due to the uncertainty about the consequences of the shock on the exchange
rate. The reason is that lower output and higher prices in country 1 would lead to opposite
effects on the trade balance, and so on the exchange rate. Therefore, the effects of the
shock on country 2 would be ambiguous, rendering also ambiguous the subsequent
feedback effect on country 1. So, in Figure 5 the LL, YY and AS1 curves shift to the left,
accompanied with an ambiguous shift of AD2; we have assume for simplicity no short-run
effect on country 2. In any case, despite this ambiguity regarding country 2, the union as a
whole would experience the same effects than country, i. e., lower output and higher
prices. In the long run, higher prices would shift leftwards LL, AS1 and AS2, leading to an
additional output fall and price increase in both country 1 and the union, as well as (in this
case) in country 2; in general, the long-run effects on country 2 are also ambiguous.
As in the case of real shocks, we can derive the condition for an asymmetric supply
shock being beggar-thy-neighbour in the other member country of the union. Expressed
again as a threshold value for σ, this condition would be:
)1(
3
2 γ−>σ
The case of a symmetric contractionary supply shock, s1 = s2 = s > 0, is shown in
Figure 6. Now, output would fall and prices would rise unambiguously both in countries 1
and 2 and in the union, in the short run and in the long run; the effect on the exchange rate
would be again ambiguous. In terms of the figure, the LL, AS1 and AS2 curves would shift
leftwards in the short run (YY would simultaneously experience a leftward and a rightward
shift, fully offsetting each other), and this shift would be reinforced in the long run
following the rise in prices.
To conclude this section, we will refer briefly to external shocks. The effect of a
positive shock to the trade balance following an increase in foreign output, ∆y* > 0, would
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 Again, the case of an asymmetric contractionary supply shock in country 2, s2 > 0, would be fully
analogous, with the results for countries 1 and 2 now happening in countries 2 and 1, respectively.
13
be analogous to the case of a symmetric expansionary real shock shown in Figure 4. In
turn, the effect of a negative shock to capital movements following an increase in the
world interest rate, ∆iW > 0, would be analogous to the case of an expansionary monetary
shock shown in Figure 2; the only difference would be that now the short run effects would
be quantitatively smaller, so that an output fall would occur in the long run both in
countries 1 and 2 and the union. Finally, a positive shock to the trade balance following an
increase in foreign prices, ∆p* > 0, would have no effects both in the short run and in the
long run, only leading to an exchange rate appreciation equal, in absolute value, to the
initial increase in foreign prices.
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4. The model for a big monetary union
4. 1. Multipliers of the shocks
Regarding the model for a big monetary union, this would be given by equations (11) to
(18), with eight endogenous variables: y1, y2, p1, p2, y*, p*, e, and iW. As in the case of the
small monetary union, we will present first the short-run multipliers, obtained after solving
the model given by equations (11) to (18), and then the long-run multipliers, obtained from
the solution of the long-run version of the model, i. e., that given by equations (11) to (13),
(14’), (15’), (16), (17), and (18’). The multipliers for the different shocks would be now:
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B) Real shocks
B. 1) Asymmetric real shocks
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in the long run.
B. 2) Symmetric real shocks
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C) Supply shocks
C. 1) Asymmetric supply shocks
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both in the short run and in the long run (except for the case of y*).
C. 2) Symmetric supply shocks
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D) External shocks
D. 1) Foreign monetary shocks
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D. 2) Foreign real shocks
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D. 3) Foreign supply shocks
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4. 2. Graphical analysis
The graphical representation of the model for the big monetary union will be analogous to
the small monetary union case. First, the short-run aggregate supply functions AS1 and AS2,
equations (14) and (15), will be used as before. Regarding the aggregate demand functions
AD1 and AD2, we will make a modification in equations (19) and (20) above. If we get iW
from the money market equilibrium conditions for the union and the rest of the world, (13)
and (17), and later replace y + y* from the goods market equilibrium conditions for the
union and the rest of the world, (1) and (16), we get:
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Replacing this expression for iW in equations (19) and (20) we get the aggregate demand
functions AD1 and AD2 to be used in this section:
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The YY curve is given again by equation (21). Finally, replacing p + p* from the
short-run aggregate supply functions for the union and the rest of the world, (10) and (18),
in the above expression for iW, we get:
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which, once replaced in equation (22) gives us the expression for the LL curve to be used
in this section:
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Next, we can examine the effects of the different shocks using our graphical
representation. Beginning again with the case of an expansionary monetary shock within
the union, m > 0, the effects of this shock on the countries of the union are fully analogous
to those occurring in the small monetary union, shown in Figure 2 above. Now, the
depreciation of the exchange rate of the union means an appreciation of the foreign
exchange rate, which would lead to a demand contraction in the rest of the world, with
falling output and prices. This in turn would mean a lower short-run expansion in the
union, via lower external demand and a lower real exchange rate depreciation. In the long
run, output would come back to its initial level in the union, with prices rising by the same
amount than the exchange rate depreciation, whereas in the rest of the world the short-run
demand expansion in the union would exactly offset the initial contraction. In other words,
a monetary shock within the union would be beggar-thy-neighbour in the short run, and
would have no effect on the rest of the world in the long run.
Now we turn to the case of an asymmetric expansionary real shock in country 1, f1
> 0, as shown in Figure 7; again, the effects of an asymmetric expansionary real shock in
country 2, f2 > 0, would be their mirror image. Although the results for country 1 are
similar to those for the small monetary union, the exchange rate appreciation means now a
depreciation of the foreign exchange rate, leading to a demand expansion in the rest of the
world. This would increase foreign output and prices so that, via higher external demand
and a lower real exchange rate appreciation, the effect on country 2’s output would be
ambiguous; together with the increase in country 1’s output, this would mean an increase
in the union’s output as well. In terms of Figure 7, the YY, LL and AD1 curves shift to the
19
right, being ambiguous the shift of AD2; in the figure, however, we have assumed a
leftward shift (which implies that LL shifts less than YY), so that country 2’s output falls
and countries 1 and 2 move from point 1 to point 2.
From the multipliers in the Appendix, we can derive the condition for an
asymmetric real shock being beggar-thy-neighbour in the other member country of the
union, as:
13
1
−βϕ
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In the rest of the world, the exchange rate depreciation leads to a contraction in its
aggregate supply, so that foreign output now falls, lowering the long-run output increase
both in country 1 and in the union; the effect on country 2’s output would be still
ambiguous. In Figure 7, the LL, AS1 and AS2 curves shift rightwards and countries 1 and 2
would move to point 38.
The case of a symmetric expansionary real shock within the union, f1 = f2 = f > 0, is
depicted in Figure 8. As in the case of the asymmetric shock, the exchange rate
appreciation in the union means a depreciation of the foreign exchange rate, which leads to
a demand expansion in the rest of the world, and hence to a short-run demand expansion in
the union too. In the figure, the LL, AD1 and AD2 curves shift rightwards, countries 1 and 2
move from point 1 to point 2, and the appreciation of the exchange rate then shifts
rightwards LL, AS1 and AS2, so countries 1 and 2 finish at point 3. As before, due to the
final contraction in foreign output, the long-run output expansion in countries 1 and 2 and
in the union would be lower than in the small monetary union; and the effect on prices
would be ambiguous.
Therefore, as we have seen, and regarding their effects on the rest of the world, an
(asymmetric or symmetric) real shock within the union would be locomotive in the short
run, and beggar-thy-neighbour in the long run.
On the other hand, the effects of supply shocks within the union would be
analogous to those analysed in the small monetary union case. As before, the condition for
an asymmetric supply shock being beggar-thy-neighbour in the other member country of
the union would be:
[ ] )1()21(3
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And, regarding their effects on the rest of the world, they would coincide with those of real
shocks, i. e., they would be locomotive in the short run, and beggar-thy-neighbour in the
long run.
We conclude this section by analysing external shocks. An expansionary monetary
shock in the rest of the world, m* > 0, shown in Figure 9, leads to a foreign demand
expansion together with an exchange rate depreciation in the rest of the world, i. e., an
appreciation in the union, which contracts demand in the short run. So, the LL, AD1 and
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 Notice that, if y2 would have increased in the short run, it would increase in the long run too, and
the increase in y1 would have been lower (AS1 would have shifted by less). Otherwise, if y2
decreases in the short run, the long run effect would be ambiguous, and the increase in y1 greater
(AS1 would have shifted by more).
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AD2 curves shift to the left in the figure, and countries 1 and 2 move from point 1 to point
2, with lower output and prices. Later on, the short-run demand expansion in the rest of the
world would lead to a demand expansion in the union fully offsetting the previous
contraction, at the same time that foreign output comes back to its initial level and prices
rise by the same amount than the foreign depreciation. In Figure 9 the LL, AD1 and AD2
curves come back to their initial position in the figure, so that output and prices in
countries 1 and 2 and in the union would be unchanged in long run. Notice that the effects
of this shock would be equivalent in the long run to those of an increase in foreign prices in
the small monetary union case. Again, as regards the union, a monetary shock occurring in
the rest of the world would have been beggar-thy-neighbour in the short run, with no effect
on the union in the long run.
Figure 10 shows the case of an expansionary real shock in the rest of the world, f* >
0. This shock would mean a foreign demand expansion coupled with an exchange rate
appreciation in the rest of the world, i. e., a depreciation in the union. Demand expands in
the union, leading to higher output and prices in the short run; the LL, AD1 and AD2 curves
shift rightwards, and countries 1 and 2 move from point 1 to point 2. Next, the
combination of higher prices in the union and in the rest of the world, and the exchange
rate depreciation, contracts aggregate supply in the union and expands it in the rest of the
world. Output falls and prices rise in the union, and output rises in the rest of the world,
with an ambiguous effect on prices. In Figure 9 the LL, AS1 and AS2 curves shift to the left,
and countries 1 and 2 finish in point 3. Notice that the effects of this shock would be
equivalent to those of an increase in the world interest rates examined in the case of a small
monetary union. And regarding their effects on the union, a real shock occurring in the rest
of the world would have been locomotive in the short run, and beggar-thy-neighbour in the
long run.
Finally, the effects of a contractionary supply shock in the rest of the world, s* > 0,
would be analogous to those of an expansionary real shock in the rest of the world, and can
be followed from Figure 10.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a general framework for the macroeconomic modelling
of monetary unions, which could be useful for policy analysis as well as for teaching
purposes. The interest in modelling monetary unions can be justified since they have
been suggested as an alternative to a system of fixed exchange rates (given the fragility
of the latter in a world of very high capital mobility), as illustrated by the recent moving
to EMU.
We use as reference framework the standard two-country Mundell-Fleming
model with perfect capital mobility, extended to incorporate the supply side in a context
of rigid real wages. This model is modified so that the money market becomes common
for two symmetric countries that form a monetary union, and keep a flexible exchange
rate against the rest of the world. The basic model is presented in two versions: for a
small and a big monetary union (i. e., if the rest of the world’s variables are taken as
exogenous or not), and is solved in two stages: the short and the long run (i. e., if prices
have adjusted to the final equilibrium or not). The solutions to the models are presented for
the different shocks analysed (monetary, real, supply, and external), both algebraically
and graphically.
The results of the paper are summarised in tables 1 and 2, for the small and the
big monetary union, respectively. Recall that the crucial point of our results refers to the
effect of asymmetric shocks. Unlike common or symmetric shocks, which lead, in the
two countries of the union, to the same effects than in a conventional model where the
monetary union is taken as one country, country-specific or asymmetric shocks lead to
different effects in the two countries of the union. In particular, the effect of an
asymmetric shock could be transmitted to the other country with either the same or the
opposite sign, when compared to the country of origin of the shock, depending on the
dominant channel of transmission of that shock (the aggregate demand, or the interest rate
and the real exchange rate, respectively).
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Table 1.A. Small monetary union: symmetric shocks (d≠0)
EFFECTS ON
OUTPUT PRICES EXCHANGE
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− −
SUPPLY
s
sr=lr
−
+ ±
sr 0 0
−
FOREIGN OUTPUT
y* lr +
− −
FOREIGN PRICES
 p*
sr=lr 0 0
−1
sr + + +WORLD INTEREST RATE
 iw lr
−
+ +
Notes: (i) sr = short run, lr = long run
(ii) d = m, f, s, y*, p*, iw
Table 1.B. Small monetary union: asymmetric shocks (di≠0, dj=0)
EFFECTS ON
OUTPUT PRICES EXCH.
 RATE
SHOCKS
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Notes: (i) sr = short run, lr = long run
(ii) di, dj = fi, fj, si, sj (i, j = 1, 2)
Table 2.A. Big monetary union: symmetric shocks (d≠0)
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Notes: (i) sr = short run, lr = long run
(ii) d = m, f, s, m*, f*, s*
Table 2.B. Big monetary union: asymmetric shocks (di≠0, dj=0)
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Notes: (i) sr = short run, lr = long run
(ii) di, dj = fi, fj, si, sj (i, j = 1, 2)
